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1. Introduction
∗ 
In the last two decades of the XIV century, Italy experienced a change in its political system, and 
simultaneously the model of economic growth shifted from agricultural to industrial. The law 
concerning tariff barriers to international trade passed on July 14
th, 1887 represents a key event of this 
process, by protecting grain, textile, sugar and steel industries. Historians agree that this decision was 
driven by the action of specific interest groups. In their view, the 1887 trade law was the result of a 
system of political and economic alliances that imposed a particular model of industrialization and, 
more in general, of economic development.
1 In other words, historians maintain that some interest 
groups affected the mechanisms of capital formation, pursuing both protection from the competition 
and specific public expenditure programs (Bonelli, 1975 p. 30; Bonelli, 1978; Capone, 1981). A 
formal analysis of this hypothesis is yet to be carried out. So far the studies that have been developed 
do not go beyond descriptive statistics to motivate their arguments and do not provide any formal test.
2 
Data limitations partly explain the absence of more rigorous inquiries on this issue.  
This paper builds on this line of reasoning: according to the public choice theory of government, 
we empirically examine the role the groups protected by the 1887 trade law exerted upon the 
expenditure decision-making process and, therefore, upon the choice of the industrialization model. 
We do not attempt to explain the economic and political determinants of the trade policy or relate 
revenues raised by tariffs with government spending. Rather, we use the protectionist trade policy of 
1887 to identify the groups that emerged as interest groups and investigate the impact of those groups 
on the size and the scope of the public sector over the 1876-1914 period. We do so by applying the 
interest group theory as a formal positive economic analysis of government behaviour. Hence, the 
theoretical background is that a major portion of governmental activity is devoted to the transfer of 
resources among citizens. Some of these citizens are net winners in this process and some are net 
losers. Government activities are therefore considered a process through which wealth (public 
expenditure) is redistributed among individuals and groups. Political motivations and incentives may 
influence expenditure decisions as politicians may use it to maximize both consensus and power. 
Policy makers act as brokers among different groups as well as legislatures are the place “to clear the 
market for wealth transfers” (Shughart and Tollison, 1986).  
                                                      
∗   We thank Emma Galli and Gaetano Sabatini for useful comments, and Giovanni Federico for sharing his data and for 
comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1   Gerschenkron highlights that public intervention and more generally the activist state policy was appropriate in the 
situation of the new Kingdom. Nevertheless, he argues that this policy was devoted to economically unproductive 
projects, such as the promotion of the steel industry in Terni in 1884 and the subsidization of the shipbuilding and naval 
industry between 1885 and 1896 (Gerschenkron, 1965, 80). Fenoaltea (1978) censures the choice of protecting the heavy 
industry, because it strongly penalized the mechanical industry due to the higher costs of iron and steel. Fenoaltea (1993) 
argue that, by lowering the domestic purchasing power of wages, the tariff on wheat indirectly caused emigration making 
world wages attractive. In contrast, Zamagni (1990) and Pescosolido (1998), applying an infant industry argument, 
maintain that without protection Italian industry would have not been able to survive foreign competition, and therefore 
Italy would not have developed. Federico and O’Rourke (1999) use a Computable General Equilibrium model to trace 
the effects of tariff on the economy. They find that the welfare effects were small: removal of trade barriers would have 
increased GDP by 2.4%, and also the income distribution effects were small. Federico and Tena (1998, 1999) compute 
effective protection rates showing that some groups were strongly protected and others were not, without any coherence 
across sectors. They conclude that the lobbying activity of some interest groups was more effective than the activity of 
other groups in capturing politicians. 
2   Brosio and Marchese (1986; 1988) build a model of demand in which the expenditure level is chosen by a median voter 
that belongs to an élite. They tested such a model for the time span 1861-1914. Fratianni and Spinelli (1982) focus on the 
determinants of public sector growth from 1861 to 1979 using a model of specialized groups. The interest group model is 
based on Demsetz (1979); yet, it is tested on a reduced period (1926-1976).    Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti 
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In the last thirty years a large empirical literature
3 explicitly relating interest groups to public policy 
variables has been developed. Such empirical literature leads to mixed results. The decision variable of 
public sector which the interest groups are supposed to influence includes two sets of dependent 
variables. The first concerns the behavior of individual political decision makers – such as the voting 
activities (one vote issue or a set of related issues) of individual legislators (Bronars and Lott, 1997). 
The second is related to the policy outcomes that range from state outlays on agricultural research to 
total government expenditures (Mueller and Murrell, 1986). Finally, we may notice that these 
empirical inquiries face an important problem connected with the identification of the proxies of the 
interest groups and thus the types of data to use.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 frames the historical and political 
background. The model is specified in section 3 and tested in section 4. The last section concludes. 
2. Identifying interest groups: the historical background 
In order to place our analysis in a historic perspective, this section provides an illustration of some 
historical events that motivate the empirical relationship we identify and show the key role of the 
interest groups in shaping public policy.  
In 1861 the Kingdom of Piedmont became the Kingdom of Italy. Since then, most of the effort was 
finalized to enforce a homogeneous set of rules throughout the national territory and to build an 
economy able to compete with the more advanced European countries. In 1876 the Right (Destra 
Storica) was defeated and the Left (Sinistra Storica) came into power. These changes in government 
produced at last two distinctive processes. First, the state became a financial institution that by means 
of public debt and receipts, redistributing some of the resources generated in agriculture to other 
sectors of the economy (Aquarone, 1981). Second, the political equilibrium based on the interests of 
landowners and traders came to an end. These processes were closely linked. On the one hand, the 
state had a prominent role in the accumulation of capital. The modernization of the economy started 
during the last ruling years as the Right became effective. Inflows of foreign capitals were favored by 
the abolition of corso forzoso and by monetary stabilization. A large government expenditure program 
was set to give the opportunity of new industrial investments. In order to increase the stock of fixed 
social capital and to support the steel-mechanical industry, privileges to Italian firms for railway works 
were accorded through the so-called Baccarini Law in 1882 and, indirectly, through the nationalization 
of the railways by the establishment of the company Ferrovie dello Stato (National Railways 
Company) in 1905. This company gave procurements to the national industry by updating the rolling-
stock. Furthermore, between 1885 and 1896, a program of subsidization of the shipbuilding and naval 
industry was promoted. Between 1885 and 1913 the national naval industry received an average of 22 
million liras per year (Zamagni, 1990). In 1884 a complete iron mill was created in Terni with of 
public funds. Overall government spending experienced a rapid growth throughout our sample. 
Simultaneously, changes in the composition of government budget took place; in particular spending 
on public services, such as transport, communication and construction and, later, spending on 
provision of public goods, such as education, increased
 (Brosio and Marchese, 1986; Aidt et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, this “new” role of the state, together with the agricultural crisis due to the 
competition from overseas and the failure of the capitalistic development in agriculture changed both 
the economic and the political weight of the primary sector. Starting from the 1880s until World War 
I, the political system was characterized by the alliance between new entrepreneurial groups, mostly 
related to the heavy industry, and the traditional landowners of the South of the liberal Italy 
(Candeloro, 1970; Capone, 1981). Moving from a political and economic model based on the primary 
sector to an industrial model resulted in the relinquishment of free-trade policies. The tariffs enacted in 
                                                      
3   For some interesting surveys of the literature on interest groups see in particular Mitchell and Munger (1991), Morton 
and Cameron (1992), Potters and van Winden (1995), van Winden (1999) and Potters and Sloof (1996). Interest Groups, Government Spending and Italian Industrial Growth (1876-1913) 
EUI-WP RSCAS 2008/08 © 2008 Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti  3 
1878 and in 1887 were simultaneously the outcome and the symbol of these “events”. Such tariffs, 
establishing protection for textile, steel, sugar and grain, ratified the hegemonic political role of the 
interests linked to these sectors.  
The effects on public policy of the consolidation of the alliance between traditional landowners and 
a more dynamic bourgeoisie appears more evident when we take into account two institutional issues 
that resulted in the electoral reform enacted in 1882. The reform extended the right for male voters, 
reduced the minimum age to vote from 25 to 21 years and required as essential condition the capacity 
instead of the census. Meanwhile the census was considered an alternative to the accomplishment of 
the second year of the primary school and was reduced from 40 to 19.80 liras. The gradual lifting of 
socio-economic restrictions on voting franchise strongly enlarged the constituency. In 1880 voters 
counted for 2.2% of the population of the Kingdom, while in 1882 they increased to 6.9% (Caracciolo, 
1977). The reform law also modified the electoral mechanism. Beginning from 1882 the districts size 
was broadened and the single-member districts replaced with a system of competing lists to favor 
competition between political-ideological groups. 
The second institutional factor that is noteworthy relies on the class composition of the Left. The 
change in power from the Right to the Left was more sociologically than ideologically relevant. In 
fact, the Left kept a substantial continuity with previous policies and retained political and social 
behavior not different from that of the Right. However, the Left was not homogeneous in bringing 
together landowners, new financial aristocracy, speculators, urban professionals and new 
entrepreneurs (Farneti, 1971). The electoral reform of 1882 was the result of the heterogeneous 
political composition of the élites and, at the same time, emphasized such heterogeneity by modifying 
both the constituency size and electoral districts. 
3. The empirical model 
Starting from the literature on interest groups, in this section the influence of the interest groups on 
public expenditure programs between 1876 and 1913 is empirically estimated. The dependent variable 
of the model is the real total expenditure (EXP). The review of the interest group literature suggests 
that the main problem of empirical analyses in this field of research is related to the identification of a 
proxy for the special group. In order to capture the pressure of the interest groups in shaping public 
policy, some models focus on their political activities, such as the influence and the recruitment of the 
electorate (Plotnik, 1986), the campaign contributions (Crain and Tollison, 1977) and the lobbying 
activity in the legislative and executive branches of government (McCornik and Tollison, 1981). As 
the data on interest groups activity are sometimes not available, some contributions use the structural 
characteristics of the groups. Gardner (1987) employs the average size of the producers and the 
percentage of owners’ income. Murrel (1984), Mueller and Murrell (1986) and McCallum and Blais 
(1987) estimate the strength of interest groups by the number of special interest organizations. To 
measure ideological groups and labor unions that are formally organized Bloch (1993) and 
Kischgassner and Pommerehne (1988) use the number or the percentage of members. When the 
interest group is not formally organized and membership data are unavailable, indirect ex ante proxies, 
such as the number of producers in an industry (Guttman, 1978; Miller, 1991) or some measures of 
concentration, are applied. Yet in this case, while the results in support of the influence of the interest 
groups in public policy formation are not robust; the relationship between numbers and influence 
might be non-monotonic and might be dependent on the type of interest group (Van Velthoven and 
Van Winden, 1986). 
We use the law enacted in 1887 as an instrument to detect the special interest groups that acted as 
“pressure groups” on the public decision-making process. By means of duties and tariffs such a law 
protected from the international competition the entrepreneurs of textile, sugar, steel and grains. All of 
them are considered in our analysis as the interest groups that affected government expenditure 
programs. As was outlined in the previous section, this approach does not describe the complexity of Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti 
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this phase of the Italian capitalistic development. In addition, one may wonder that the political 
decisions which the 1887 law reflects were not the outcome of a coherent vision for supporting certain 
industries instead of others. Nevertheless, the relationship between public expenditure and the interest 
groups that benefited from the protectionist law seems historically correct and analytically sustainable. 
Some of the mechanisms put in action in 1887 (in particular, the willingness of the political system to 
compromise with interest groups) kept in place for long time (among others, Bonelli, 1978; Aquarone, 
1981). Moreover, certain objectives of the trade law (such as the development of heavy industry) were 
never put into question and for others (such as the protection of the cultivation and processing of 
grain) there was room for future changes, but not for a complete reevaluation (Aquarone, 1981).  
Some models (Murrel, 1984; Muller and Murrel, 1986) measure interest groups using either the 
number of special interest organizations in a country or the number of the members of each group. 
Because of the lack of data, it is impossible to replicate this procedure. Even so, the use of the number 
of the workers is an unsatisfactory way to measure and compare the interest group influence in our 
sample because the groups we identify present a quite different capital/labor ratio. For this reason, we 
cannot exclude a priori that a sector may have relatively few members due to a more intensive use of 
the capital, but which may exert a large impact on public decision making process.  
Instead, one may argue that an index of concentration would be a more appropriate measure. In our 
sample textile and grain productions are fragmented in a wide number of medium and small sized 
enterprises. An index of concentration might underestimate the strength of the interest group as a 
pressure group. These considerations, together with the unavailability of suitable alternative data have 
driven to measure the identified groups through the gross saleable output of cereals (CER) and the 
value added of the textile (TEX) and the iron and steel industries (ISI). As disaggregated data do not 
exist for the sugar industry, we are not able to construct the related interest group proxy. The measures 
we propose make it possible to compare the strength of the different entrepreneurs in shaping 
government expenditure. Furthermore, as we emphasize the importance of the special interest groups 
in adding additional expenditure items to the public budget, our proxies give a good approximation of 
the income that these industries produced and then of the wealth transfers that policy makers caused 
through redistribution and public expenditure. The basic hypothesis is that the size of government is 
positively related to the strength of the interest groups; thus, CER, TEX and ISI are expected to be positive. 
The traditional role of the government views it as a provider of public goods. We consider this 
issue by including the variable POP, which is the size of the total population. We expect that POP is 
positive, since demand for public goods grows as long as population increases. Finally, we take into 
consideration changes in the institutional, political and legislative environment that have occurred 
along the transition from a restrictive electoral system to its extension in 1882. We do so by means of 
a dummy variable, ELE, which takes the value of 0 between 1876 and 1881 and 1 from 1882 to 1913. 
Basic economic principles suggest that the extension of voting franchise should be associated with 
some expansion of the public sector, in particular in cases where democratically elected governments 
become accountable to poorer voters (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In addition, the literature on 
constituency size (Thornton and Ulrich, 1999) argues that increases in constituency size over time may 
account for an increase in the size of government. The rationale is that as the number of the 
constituents per legislator increases, it becomes more difficult for constituents to monitor their 
representatives. Furthermore, larger constituency sizes produce districts that are more heterogeneous 
in terms of both economic interests and population. This implies that representatives find it less costly 
to trade their votes. The result is an expansion in public expenditure. On the basis of these arguments 
we expect ELE to be positive. Finally, we include per capita GDP because, according to the Wagner 
Law, as a society becomes richer, there is an increasing demand for public expenditure. 
The basic model used to describe expenditure decision making process is the following: 
 
EXP t = α 1+α2GDPpct+  α3 CERt + α 4TEX t + α 5 ISI t + α 6POPt + α 7ELE t + ετ   (1) 
 Interest Groups, Government Spending and Italian Industrial Growth (1876-1913) 
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where all variables are expressed in logs and ετ is a random error. Figures 1 and 2 show the behavior 
over time of population and government spending, respectively. 
FIGURE 1. Population level (1876-1913) 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Real public expenditure 1876-1913 (million liras) 
 
 
The dependent variable is taken from Federico (2007), it is constructed using data from Ragioneria 
Generale dello Stato (1969) and expressed at 1911 prices. Most of the state budget consisted in 
payment of interests on public debt and military expenditure (mainly for personnel), therefore it was 
unsuitable for discretionary fiscal choices. This model accounts for the residual discretionary part. The 
gross sealable output of cereals is provided by Federico. In a number of works he has reconstructed the Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti 
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statistical data for agriculture, showing that previous estimates from Istat (1957) overestimated grain 
production in the early 1870s and underestimated agricultural production from the 1880s until World 
War I. Federico (2000) reports the value added and gross sellable output data for benchmarks in 1891, 
1911, 1938 and 1951, divided for the most important products.
4 In a subsequent paper (Federico, 
2003) he gives the gross sellable output for the whole agricultural production from 1861 to 1913. Our 
data, directly provided by Giovanni Federico (which should be considered preliminary), gives the 
gross sellable output of cereals, which we take as a proxy for grain production. TEX, ISI and per capita 
GDP are taken from the new estimates of Italian industrial production given by Fenoaltea (2005).
5 All 
production data are in 1911 prices. POP is taken form Istat (1957).  
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Tests for nonstationarity  
Before estimating the structural equation, the analysis of the stochastic properties of the series is 
applied in order to establish whether public expenditure and all explanatory variables used in the 
regression model share a long or a short run relationship. This information makes it possible to 
correctly specify the model by avoiding spurious regression problems. The stationarity has been 
verified by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF), and the autoregressive structure has been 
determined according the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). The test specification includes a 
constant and a trend for all series. The results are presented in Table 1: nonstationarity cannot be 
rejected for all series but CER. 
TABLE 1 - Unit root tests  
 
ADF test statistics  Lags  Order of integration 
GDP  -0.3759 1  I(0) 
EXP  -1.1513 1  I(1) 
CER -4.2748  3  I(0) 
ISI -2.5478  1  I(1) 
TEX -3.3803  1  I(1) 
POP -2.8665  2  I(1) 
All specifications include trend and intercept. Critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% for the ADF tests with 
trend and intercept are -3.96, -3.41, and -3.13, respectively.  
4.2. Regression results 
The assessment of the stochastic properties of the series allows us to express equation (1) by first 
differencing EXP, ISI, TEX, GDPpc and POP in order to prevent spurious regression. Therefore, the 
estimated regressions are short-term relations. From an econometric point of view, the estimated 
equations explain a fair amount of the variability in government spending, and the F-statistics always 
maintain that the variables are jointly significantly different from zero. 
                                                      
4   The gross salable output is the value of all products minus their reinvestment in the agricultural sector. The value added is 
obtained from the gross sellable output by subtracting the cost of expenditures from other sectors of the economy. For the 
years 1891 and 1911 the expenditure to gross sellable output ratio was equal to 4.3% and 7.09%, respectively. 
5   Ercolani (1969) produced the first historical estimates of the Italian production. These estimates have been used in all the 
following revisions of national accounts by Maddison (1991), Rossi et al. (1993), Fuà and Gallegati (1993). 
Fenoaltea (2005) maintain that all series underestimate industrial and agricultural production in the 1880s 
and the 1890s, and they overestimate growth at the turn of the centuries. He provides a new series from 1861 
to 1913.  Interest Groups, Government Spending and Italian Industrial Growth (1876-1913) 
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TABLE 2 – Regression results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant  -6.7175      
(4.7213) 
-6.63093*      
(3.6804) 




GDP  0.4890**     
(0.1823) 
0.5116***     
(0.1554) 




CER  -0.0012       
(0.0033) 
-0.0009   (0.0034)     
dTEX  -0.2191           
(0.3374) 
-0.2152     (0.3304) -0.2483     (0.2604)   
dISI  0.2838**          
(0.1187) 
0.2792**     
(0.1142) 




dPOP  2.6516            
(5.6881) 
2.8537       
(4.885) 
1.5131      (1.3180)  4.8446 
(3.1530) 
ELE  0.0047         
(0.0338) 
    
N 37  37  37 37 
R
2  0.3037 0.2918 0.2866 0.2747 
F 2.107*  2.061*  2.491* 3.03** 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses. The operator d indicates first differences. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
The variable CER is positive but not significantly different from zero. The class of grain cultivators 
represented principally elderly landowners. They were not interested in the capitalistic development of 
agriculture; rather they operated in order to keep their property rights and to crystallize social and 
productive relationships.
6 Therefore, it is reasonable to maintain that they controlled more on the 
receipts side of the budget, rather than on expenditure. Indeed, between 1885 and 1910 the estate tax 
decreased from 125 to 84 million liras (Castronovo, 1975, p. 143). Nevertheless, the requests of the 
traditional landowners were focused on the tariff of wheat that scholars (Toniolo, 1978, among others) 
consider the pactum sceleris the protected industrial sectors accepted to buy their privileges.
7  
The coefficient of ISI is significantly positive. Empirical evidence suggests the idea, maintained by 
historians, that the state helped the iron and steel industry through procurement both in the military 
and in the railway sectors (in particular after nationalization in 1905). In addition, government grants 
supported the naval industry. Despite the fact that such industry was founded with the direct support of 
the state, this result emphasizes that it was a private business. It was able to put pressure on the 
government to guarantee a satisfying utilization of the productive capacity, overcoming the small size 
of the national market. The establishment of the “Società degli Altoforni, Acciaierie e Fonderie di 
Terni” in 1884 is the most evident sign of the role of the interest groups in the political framework and 
of an accurate logrolling within the legislature (Bonelli, 1975, p.15). The society, in fact, even 
remaining a private business, was the result of both the private capitals, headed by V. S. Breda, which 
also was elected in the Senate, and the capital of the state, that anticipated 12 million liras to the 
society buying some components of military navies. Furthermore, the interest group of metal-makers 
                                                      
6   Most likely, the interest of the grain entrepreneurs in the infrastructures, such as ports for sea-transportation, will grow 
stronger during the World War I. 
7   Maffeo Pantaleoni (1901) in a speech at the Chamber of Deputies highlighted that the tariff on wheat: 1) rewarded solely 
the landowners (about 50,000 units) and harmed both the sharecroppers and the tenants that waited for relocation; 2) 
guaranteed to the landowners a return (150 million liras) higher than costs represented by the estate tax (107 million liras).  Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti 
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also benefited from monetary and credit policy: Terni iron mills avoided bankruptcy by loans funded 
by the Bank of Italy (Bonelli, 1975; Cerioni, 2001). 
The variable TEX is insignificant. The different behavior of the textile and the steel entrepreneurs 
emerged already from the Inchiesta Industriale, a document framed during the last years of the 
government of the Left (1870-1874) and considered by the historians the most important source of 
information to reconstruct the origin of the protectionist choice realized in 1878 and 1887.
8 The Atti 
dell’Inchiesta Industriale emphasized that textile and steel entrepreneurs demanded aid from the state, 
especially in the form of protectionist measures. However, while the textile undertakers did not insert 
such request in a dynamic strategy oriented to a qualitative reinforcement of their firms, the steel 
entrepreneurs asked for public investments also in education to guarantee a skilled labor. 
Population is not significantly different from zero. This result shows that government expenditure 
does not exhibit the most basic public good characteristic, probably because most of the population did 
not have the right to vote. The dummy variable for the extension of the franchise has a similar 
behavior, showing that the increase in the number of potential voters did not have significant effects. 
Indeed, the right to vote was not exercised by many Catholic voters because of the Rome issue, 
therefore the number of effective voters remained small.
9 Per capita GDP is always significantly 
positive, indicating support to the Wagner law.  
4.3. Impulse response analysis 
In order to check the robustness of the results, we trace out the effects of a change in our measures of 
interest groups on government spending by producing impulse response functions. In this way we are 
also able to consider the dynamic effects of lags on government spending. When the two variables are 
I(1), we look for the existence of a long run relationship between them by the Johansen cointegration 
test (Johansen, 1994). If such a relationship exists, we estimate a Vector Error Correction Model. If the 
variables show a different orders of integration, we estimate a Vector AutoRegressive model, we take 
the first-difference of the I(1) variable, in order to have them at the same order of integration.  
Consider the variables EXP and ISI. Both are I(1), therefore we check for cointegration. Table 3 
shows that the autoregressive structure, determined by the Schwartz Information Criterion, is equal to 
3. The Johansen tests maintain that there is one cointegrating vector. As Figure 3 indicates, ISI shows 
a positive, significant and persistent effect on EXP. The confidence interval (at the 5% significance 
level) is constructed by bootstrapping, using 2,000 replications (Hall, 1992). The relationship between 
EXP and ISI may run the other way round: government spending may affect the iron and steel 
production. Therefore, we estimate response of ISI to a shock in EXP. Figure 4 shows that this effect is 
typically insignificant, therefore, we can rule out the hypothesis that government spending affects iron 
and steel output. 
TABLE 3 – Cointegration results 
Variables  Lags  Null hypothesis  Test value  p-value 
EXP, ISI  3  r = 0  25.68  0.0508 
     r = 1  7.78  0.2881 
EXP, TEX  6  r = 0  31.91  0.0065 
     r = 1  6.71  0.3864 
The number of lags is determined by the Schwartz Information Criterion. Specifications include a trend and a 
constant. Critical values for the null r = 0 are 23.32, 25.73, and 30.62 at the 90%, 95% and 99% significance 
levels, respectively. For the null r = 1 they are equal to 10.68, 12.45, and 16.22, respectively. 
                                                      
8   See on this point Baglioni (1974) and Marongiu (1995, 311-312). 
9   During the period we consider governments faced the so-called brigantaggio (rubbery) in Southern Italy, and the fasci 
siciliani, a separatist political movement in Sicily, which represented a way to express social discontent. Interest Groups, Government Spending and Italian Industrial Growth (1876-1913) 
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FIGURE 3. VECM impulse response (ISI→EXP) 
 
FIGURE 4. VECM impulse response (EXP →ISI) 
 
For TEX and EXP, the number of lag is set equal to 6, and Table 3 indicates that we cannot reject 
the null of one cointegrating vector. However, Figure 5 shows that there are no effects of TEX on 
government spending. Finally, CER and EXP are I(0) and I(1), respectively. In this case we apply a 
VAR in the CER and the first-difference of government spending. We use the Choleski decomposition 
of the variance-covariance matrix of innovations. The endogenous number of lags is 3, and the effect 
of a shock in CER on dEXP is not significantly different from zero (Figure 6).
10 
                                                      
10  The same qualitative result is obtained when government spending enters the VAR in level. Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti 
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FIGURE 5. VECM impulse response (TEX→EXP) 
 
FIGURE 6. VECM impulse response (CER→dEXP) 
 
These results confirm that the heavy industry exerts on the expenditure decision-making process an 
influence stronger than that exercised by the other considered groups. Since the impulse response 
analysis is particularly sensitive to the ordering of the variables, we also checked the robustness of 
these findings by estimating the responses for a different causal ordering of the variables. The 
responses of EXP to the shocks in the different variables are remarkably similar in all cases.  
5. Conclusions 
The trade tariffs imposed in 1878 and confirmed in 1887 are usually indicated as the symbolic choice 
of an industrialization model. It is reasonable to maintain that these political decisions were not the Interest Groups, Government Spending and Italian Industrial Growth (1876-1913) 
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outcome of a careful and systematic attempt to set favorable conditions for the birth and the 
development of particular industries. However, historiography emphasizes that these episodes were 
the result of positive answers to the requests of powerful interest groups. Such requests strengthened 
the alliance between these groups in the short run, while in the long run they were able to affect some 
of the key points of the industrialization process. Starting from these considerations we have tested the 
influence that the groups protected in 1887 exerted on the expenditure decision making process over 
1876-1913. The results point to the role of the iron and steel industries as the most powerful interest 
group. Our analysis indirectly suggests the idea that Italy followed a model of economic development 
in which “manchesterian” experiences (the textile industry) coexisted with high capital-to-labor ratio 
industries (the heavy industry).  
This paper innovates the existing literature from a methodological point of view. Apart from the 
contributions by Fratianni and Spinelli (1982) and Brosio and Marchese (1986; 1988), most of the 
studies in economic history are mainly descriptive and use neither economic modeling nor statistical 
inference. With respect to the specific hypothesis our analysis addresses, historians take for granted 
that protectionism was imposed by an “agrarian-industrial” block without consider policy-making 
processes, institutional factors, individual politicians’ preferences. This paper emphasizes that 
legislators respond to the incentives inherent in their institutional environment. They act by brokering 
transfers among the various groups within a set of institutional constraints. The aims of individual 
political agents may therefore affect the final outcomes of the political process. In this way, this 
analysis makes it possible to reconsider some of the evaluations on the appropriateness and on the 
effects of the protectionist choice. Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti 
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